CASE NAME: Sri Binoj P J v. State of Karnataka & Anr.
CASE NUMBER: Criminal Petition No. 17142 of 2025
COURT: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru
DATE: 12th January, 2026
QUORUM: Hon’ble Mr Justice M. Nagaprasanna
FACTS
In this current case, the Karnataka High Court is considering a criminal petition filed by Sri Binoj P.J., where he is seeking to quash criminal charges filed against him under Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
In the background of this case, Crime No. 1 of 2025 was originally filed as an independent offence with multiple accused. The police seized the petitioner’s mobile phone when gathering evidence in relation to that case. During the forensic analysis of the mobile phone’s contents, numerous images and videos of child pornography were located by the experts tasked with conducting the forensic examination of the mobile phone. After this discovery, law enforcement authorities that had previously investigated the original case subsequently filed a separate complaint against the petitioner, alleging that he had violated the POCSO and IT Acts. As a result, the petitioner is now the single accused in Special Case No. 2119 of 2025, which is currently pending before the Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge in Bengaluru.
The petitioner filed a criminal motion with the High Court under s. 528 of the BNSS due to dissatisfaction with the criminal proceedings brought against him and asked that the High Court dismiss all pending charges before the trial court.
ISSUES
- Whether merely storing or possessing child pornographic material on a mobile phone without transmitting or sharing it constitutes an offence under Section 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the IT Act.
- Whether the criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 2119 of 2025 were liable to be quashed at the stage of evidence.
LEGAL PROVISIONS
- Section 67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000 punishes publication, transmission, browsing, and possession of child pornographic material in electronic form.
- Section 15 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (as amended in 2019) punishes storage or possession of child pornographic material with specific intent, in three distinct sub-sections.
- Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 inherent powers of the High Court to quash proceedings.
ARGUMENTS
PETITIONER:
Sri Deenabandhu Rai N., counsel for the petitioner, put forward a straightforward argument that Binoj had only kept those photos and videos on his phone that he had never circulated or sent to anyone. The defence was essentially that possession alone, without any act of transmission or sharing, does not meet the threshold for an offence under Section 67B of the IT Act or Section 15 of the POCSO Act. He further pointed out that charges had already been framed in the case, which made it even more important to examine whether the foundational ingredients of the offence were actually made out against the petitioner.
RESPONDENT:
The petition was opposed by Sri Vinay Mahadevaiah, the State’s High Court Government Pleader. According to the State, the forensic analysis of the petitioner’s phone had unmistakably shown that it contained a significant amount of child pornographic material, which was enough to warrant the charges. The argument was that the storage of such material with the potential to be shared is sufficient to constitute the offense, and the law does not require actual transmission for liability to arise.
ANALYSIS
The Court dealt with this question head-on and found the petitioner’s argument to be completely unacceptable. Justice Nagaprasanna placed heavy reliance on the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish [2024 SCC OnLine SC 2611], which had settled this exact debate once and for all. The Apex Court in that case had laid down a detailed and exhaustive interpretation of both Section 15 of the POCSO Act and Section 67B of the IT Act.
The petitioner filed a criminal motion with the High Court under s. 528 of the BNSS due to dissatisfaction with the criminal proceedings brought against him, and asked that the High Court dismiss all pending charges before the trial court. Section 15(3) covers storage for commercial purposes. The critical point, as the Supreme Court explained, is that none of these sub-sections require actual transmission; it is the intention behind the storage that matters, and that intention is inferred from the circumstances.
The Supreme Court had also introduced the concept of an ‘inchoate offence’ to explain why storage alone is punishable. An inchoate crime is one where the intention and preparatory act are themselves made punishable, even before the actual harm is caused. The law criminalises possession with intent because it is impossible in most cases to directly prove what someone planned to do with the material, so the courts infer the intent from how the material was stored and whether the person made any attempt to delete or report it.
The High Court then applied this to the facts before it. Binoj had admittedly stored a large volume of child pornographic pictures and videos on his personal mobile phone. He had not deleted them, not reported them, and there was nothing on record to show that the material had ended up on his phone accidentally or without his knowledge. The fact that he had not sent it to anyone did not help him, because the law under Section 15(1) does not demand actual transmission, it only requires that the manner of storage itself be indicative of an intent to share. A personal phone filled with such material, with no attempt to delete or report it, was exactly the scenario the law was designed to catch.
The Court also noted that Section 67B of the IT Act, particularly sub-section (b), goes even further; it specifically penalises the mere browsing or viewing of child pornographic material stored on a mobile device, in addition to its transmission. This meant that even the act of watching such content on his own phone made the petitioner liable. The Court firmly rejected the contention that only transmission triggers liability under these provisions.
JUDGMENT
The High Court found no merit in the petition and rejected it outright. The Court held that since charges had already been framed and the matter was at the stage of evidence, there was no warrant for interference at this point. The Court made clear that Binoj’s admitted storage of child pornographic material on his personal phone attracted the ingredients of Section 15 of the POCSO Act, and that the absence of transmission was not a defence. The petitioner was directed to face a full-blown trial and prove his innocence before the trial court.
CONCLUSION
This case is a clear signal that the defence of ‘I only kept it, I never sent it’ will not work when it comes to child pornographic content. The Karnataka High Court, following the Supreme Court’s settled position, has affirmed that storing such material on a personal device without deleting or reporting it is itself a criminal act under POCSO and the IT Act. The judgment reinforces the protective intent behind these laws and makes it harder for individuals to escape liability on a technical plea. The trial now continues, and it is for the petitioner to clear his name before the court.
“PRIME LEGAL is a National Award-winning law firm with over two decades of experience across diverse legal sectors. We are dedicated to setting the standard for legal excellence in civil, criminal, and family law.”
WRITTEN BY: KISLAY RAJ
read the judgment of copy here
