CASE NAME: MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ORS. VERSUS GURMEET SINGH AND COMPANY) INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD
CASE NUMBER: Civil Appeal No. ___ of 2026 (@ SLP (C) No. 21375 of 2025)
COURT: Supreme Court of India
DATE: 23 September, 2026
QUORUM: Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ.
FACTS
Tender for the hiring of Heavy Earth Moving Machinery for various jobs in the Kulda Open Cast Project, Basundhara–Garjanbahal Areas in Sundargarh was issued on 07.11.2012 by Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (MCL). GSCO bagged the contract and a contract was drawn. There was no arbitration clause in the said contract. Disputes have arisen between the parties due to claims arising out of the said contract.
Justice M.M. Das (Retd.), was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Orissa High Court in its common order dated 25.03.2019 consequent upon the submissions made to the High Court. The arbitration was held at Cuttack and the award was made in favor of GSCO on 25.10.2021.
Three petitions were filed by MCL under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in the District Court, Sundargarh on 08.12.2021, for setting aside the arbitral award. GSCO objected to the maintainability of the petitions, claiming that they were filed in a court without territorial jurisdiction and were also out of limitation period.
According to the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack is the seat of arbitration as an arbitrator had been appointed by the High Court at Cuttack and arbitration proceedings had been carried out at Cuttack. It therefore held that the Sundargarh Court lacked jurisdiction and that the Section 34 petitions were also time-barred.
ISSUES
- Whether the petitions filed by MCL under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the District Judge, Sundargarh were barred by limitation.
- Whether the District Court, Sundargarh had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 petitions.
- Whether Cuttack could be treated as the juridical seat of arbitration merely because the arbitration proceedings were conducted there and the Arbitrator was appointed by the Orissa High Court at Cuttack.
- Whether Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act required all subsequent applications to be filed before the Orissa High Court at Cuttack.
LEGAL PROVISIONS
- Section 2(1)(e), Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 – Defining the competent “Court” in cases of arbitration.
- Section 11 (6), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – relating to appointment of arbitrators by the court.
- Section 34, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -providing for setting aside of arbitral awards.
- Section 34 (3), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996- Regarding limitation. For filing section 34 applications.
- Section 42, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996- Determining the court for subsequent applications of arbitration.
- Section 151, code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Inherent Powers of the Court.
- Article 226 and 227, Constitution of India- Writ and supervisory jurisdiction of the high courts.
ARGUMENTS
APPELLANT:
MCL stated that the petitions under Section 34 were filed on 08.12.2021, while the arbitral award was made on 25.10.2021, and hence, the petitions under Section 34 were well within time as per the limitation period stipulated under Section 34(3). The Attorney General also contended that the agreement envisaged disputes being within the jurisdiction of the court whose territorial jurisdiction covered the area of work. The jurisdiction of the District Court, Sundargarh was maintained because the work was done in Sundargarh.
The MCL further cited the contractual provisions that specified that disputes would be adjudicated by the District Court where the work was executed. It was argued that the mere fact that arbitration proceedings were conducted in Cuttack for convenience does not necessarily mean that Cuttack is the juridical seat of arbitration.
RESPONDENTS:
GSCO argued that the petitions under Section 34 were not maintainable in the Court of Sundargarh because the place of arbitration was Cuttack and that it had used Section 42 which states that since the arbitrator was nominated by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack under Section 11(6) of the Act, any subsequent application would have to be made in the same court. GSCO also initially contended that the Section 34 petitions were barred by limitation.
But during the hearing in the Supreme Court, the Respondent rightly conceded that the finding of the High Court regarding limitation was wrong.
ANALYSIS
In this regard, the Supreme Court ruled that the seat of arbitration is different from the venue of arbitration. Cuttack could not have been considered as the juridical seat simply on the basis of the fact that arbitration proceedings took place in Cuttack or that the Arbitrator was appointed by the Orissa High Court located in Cuttack. No agreement or order designated Cuttack as the seat. It is only the jurisdiction of the court at the place where the work was done, which has been stated in the contract, and the work was carried out in Sundargarh. Therefore, the District Judge, Sundargarh had jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 petitions.
It was further observed that the petitions were not barred under the law of limitation, as they were filed on 08.12.2021, i.e., within three months from the date of the arbitral award of 25.10.2021. It may be pointed out that the Respondent himself accepted that there was an error in the decision of the High Court regarding the law of limitation. The Supreme Court therefore found the High Court’s decision unsustainable and restored the Section 34 petitions before the District Judge, Sundargarh for decision in accordance with law.
JUDGMENT
It is made clear that the physical location of the arbitration would not necessarily be considered as the jurisdictional seat of arbitration. It is only when there is no explicit mention of the jurisdictional seat of arbitration that the court in whose jurisdiction the matter lies has to be decided on the basis of statutes and the agreement of the parties. The Supreme Court therefore restored the Section 34 proceedings before the District Judge, Sundargarh.
CONCLUSION
The appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court and the order of the Orissa High Court made on 20.06.2025 was set aside. It was held that Section 34 applications filed before the District Judge, Sundargarh were maintainable and were not hit by limitation. The Supreme Court held that Cuttack could not be considered as the place of arbitration simply because the arbitration proceeding was conducted there or the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court of Cuttack.
The Section 34 applications were restored to the files of the District Judge, Sundargarh for decision in accordance with law.
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WRITTEN BY: KHWAISH SACHDEVA
