CASE NAME: Paramjit Singh Bedi Vs. State Of Punjab
CASE NUMBER: Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 2015 (2026 INSC 1054)
COURT: Supreme Court of India
DATE: 25 September, 2026
QUORUM: Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
FACTS
On 19.06.2009 at about 7:30 PM, the prosecutrix (PW-1), then a Class VIII student, left home to buy groceries. The appellant, a former neighbour and the father of her friend Nancy, stopped her and said Nancy wanted to meet her. He took her by car to LIG Flats, Ludhiana. She alleged that he kept her there for two days and had sexual intercourse with her against her will. On 22.06.2009, he took her on a scooter to an abandoned factory in Malerkotla, where she said he repeated the act and threatened to kill her when she objected. On 25.06.2009, her father (PW-2) and the police intercepted them near Railway Colony No. 5, Ludhiana.
FIR No. 142/2009 was registered under Sections 363, 366A and 376 IPC, and the chargesheet was filed under Sections 366 and 376. The Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, acquitted the appellant under Section 366 on 01.06.2012, giving him the benefit of doubt. He held that the prosecution had not proved she was under 18 and that she had gone with the appellant of her own will. On the same evidence, he convicted the appellant under Section 376 and sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000. The High Court dismissed the appeal on 12.09.2013. The Supreme Court granted leave on 30.01.2015 and released the appellant on bail after nearly six years in custody.
ISSUES
- Whether a conviction under Section 376 IPC can stand when the same testimony was disbelieved for the charge under Section 366 IPC.
- Whether the prosecutrix’s testimony was credible enough to sustain a conviction on her word alone.
- Whether the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act, 1872, or the prosecutrix’s alleged minority, changed the outcome.
LEGAL PROVISIONS
- Section 366, IPC 1860 – kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel her marriage or force her into illicit intercourse.
- Sections 359, 361 and 362, IPC – define kidnapping, kidnapping from lawful guardianship and abduction.
- Sections 375 and 376, IPC (pre-2013) – rape and its punishment. The Court applied the unamended provisions because the incident occurred in June 2009.
- Section 114A, Evidence Act, 1872 – presumption of absence of consent in certain rape prosecutions.
- Section 313, CrPC 1973 – examination of the accused.
ARGUMENTS
Appellant: He was falsely implicated. PW-2 had borrowed Rs. 1,50,000 from him and, when asked to repay, threatened to implicate in some criminal case. There was also a pending civil dispute with Major Singh, a relative of PW-2, over the tenanted premises. The acquittal under Section 366 had attained finality, and it rested on a finding that the prosecutrix was a major who went willingly. She raised no alarm on the car, scooter or train journeys. Medical evidence showed no injury. Her clothes were recovered from the scooter’s dicky, which suggested she left home prepared to stay away.
State: The evidence established intercourse without consent. The school certificate put her age at about 15, so her consent was immaterial. The appellant also failed to rebut the Section 114A presumption, which the High Court had applied.
ANALYSIS
The Court first reviewed Section 366 and the related provisions, since the two charges were closely connected on these facts. It agreed with the Sessions Judge’s reasoning on Section 366 and noted that neither the State nor the informant had challenged that acquittal. The age of the prosecutrix had not been proved to be below 18. The ossification test put her age at 17 to 19 years, and the trial court proceeded on 19.
The Court then examined the testimony of PW-1, which it found full of contradictions. She could not give the car’s number or colour, or the names of the two boys. She said the appellant took her to Malerkotla on 25.06.2009, although her own account placed that journey on 22.06.2009. She said in examination-in-chief that they returned by car, but in cross-examination that they returned by train without tickets. She claimed she shouted for help in the Malerkotla room, yet raised no alarm on the crowded, brightly lit roads and never tried to get off the scooter. The Court found the claim of raising a hue and cry “does not make any sense” against that conduct and held her testimony not credible.
On the medical evidence, PW-7 found no external or private-part injury. The Court held that spermatozoa on the vaginal swab did not prove rape in these circumstances.
The Court criticised the Sessions Judge for reconciling his two findings by remarking that “some daring women” travel with men but may not consent to sex. It called the word “daring” uncalled for. It accepted that a woman may travel with a man and still not consent, but held the context here was different. She had stayed away from home for five or six days and travelled about with the appellant voluntarily.
The Court reaffirmed that a conviction can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, but only if her statement inspires confidence. She cannot be believed for Section 376 after being disbelieved for Section 366, because unimpeachable evidence must be accepted in full. The appellant’s conduct might be immoral, but that alone could not sustain a conviction without credible evidence. The Court did not separately address the State’s Section 114A argument or its submission on minority, resting its decision on the credibility of the testimony and the finality of the Section 366 findings.
JUDGMENT
The appeal was allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the Sessions Judge’s judgment dated 01.06.2012 and the High Court’s judgment dated 12.09.2013, and cleared the appellant of the charge under Section 376 IPC.
CONCLUSION
The judgment restates that a court cannot pick the parts of a witness’s account that suit one charge and discard the rest for another. Where a prosecutrix’s version has already been disbelieved on the same facts, a conviction resting on that version cannot survive, however unconventional the accused’s conduct. The Court also made clear that a judge’s personal notions about how women behave are no substitute for evidence. The order does not dilute the rule that a prosecutrix’s sole testimony can convict. It shows that such testimony must be scrutinised as a whole and must be reliable.
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WRITTEN BY: HARSHMEET KAUR SUDAN
