CASE NAME: Anil Kaushik and Anr. Vs. Sourabh Khemani
CASE NUMBER: FMAT 220 of 2026, with CAN 1 of 2026 and CAN 2 of 2026.
COURT: Calcutta High Court, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction.
DATE: 7 September 2026.
QUORUM: Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De.
FACTS
In this defamation case between the respondent, Sourabh Khemani, and the appellants, Anil Kaushik and others, certain e-mails were involved, wherein certain allegations had been made by the appellants with regard to the behavior of the respondent in respect of certain companies like CyberCorp Limited and Sundyne Technologies Private Limited. An injunction was issued by the Trial Court directing the appellants not to send e-mails to third parties having no connection with the said business and not to make any allegation against the respondent with regard to his management of the business that could be termed as illegal. However, the Trial Court allowed the appellants to make their grievances legally before any competent authority with regard to illegal activities. The appellants filed the appeal against this order in the Calcutta High Court. They alleged that the Trial Court has ignored the Bonnard Principle according to which in a defamation suit an injunction cannot be granted by the court unless it is convinced that the defence of justification for the truth is bound to fail. Further, the appellants claimed that the e-mails were in fact legal notifications/lawsuits related to the legal and corporate wrongdoings and were sent mostly to people associated with the companies. However, the respondent contended that the e-mails were in fact sent to third parties as well and were aimed at harming his reputation in the business community.
ISSUES
- Whether the Trial Court was justified in granting an interim injunction in the defamation suit without applying the Bonnard Principle?
- Whether the appellants could rely upon the defence of justification/truth when the truth or legality of the allegations had not yet been determined at trial?
- Whether the injunction restraining the appellants from sending e-mails to “third parties” and raising “illegal allegations” was vague and legally sustainable?
- Whether the appellants were entitled to challenge the injunction despite the delay in filing the appeal?
LEGAL PROVISIONS
- Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India — Right to freedom of speech and expression.
- Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC, 1908 — Temporary/interim injunctions.
- Section 151, CPC, 1908 — Inherent powers of the Court.
- Section 499, IPC — Defamation (Section 356, BNS)
- Bonnard Principle — Injunction in defamation should generally not be granted unless the defence of truth/justification is certain to fail.
- Bonnard v. Perryman — Origin of the Bonnard Principle.
- Fraser v. Evans — Reaffirmed the principle.
- Tata Sons Ltd. v. Greenpeace International — Applied the principle in India.
ARGUMENTS
APPELLANT:
The Appellants’ submission was that the Trial Court had totally failed to apply the Bonnard Principle according to which the Court must be very careful before issuing any interim injunction on defamation claims. The Appellants made references to Bonnard v. Perryman, Fraser v. Evans and Tata Sons Ltd. v. Greenpeace International and submitted that unless the defence of justification was certain to fail in the trial, no injunction would be issued. They submitted that the two e-mails contained allegations regarding alleged legal and corporate breaches and had some connection with the legal notices and proceedings against CyberCorp Limited and Sundyne Technologies Private Limited. Thus, the defence of truth/justification was available to them. The Appellants further argued that the e-mails did not constitute any public statement to the general public but the e-mails were substantially addressed to the officials of the company, its shareholders, and interested parties. It was also submitted that the Trial Court itself accepted that at this stage, it was not possible for the court to decide that the allegations were true or not and therefore, it was not possible for it to decide that the defence of justification was bound to fail.
RESPONDENTS:
It is alleged by the respondent that the e-mails sent were not limited only to the directors and shareholders of CyberCorp Limited but went to third parties unrelated to the firm as well. The purpose of doing so was to spoil the reputation of the respondent among business persons who could interact with CyberCorp Limited. It is also contended by the respondent that he has already resigned from CyberCorp Limited and that the appellants were tarnishing his image by making vile accusations against him, especially in the e-mail dated 31 January 2026. The respondent also maintained that the injunction granted by the Trial Court was limited to prevent the appellants from sending such e-mails to third parties not related to business transactions, but did not stop them from complaining to the proper authorities. Therefore, according to the respondent, the appellants’ legal rights were not unnecessarily restricted.
ANALYSIS
The High Court observed that there had been a serious misapprehension of the law regarding ordinary principles of interim injunctions without considering the Bonnard Principle. The Trial Court itself had acknowledged that it was not possible at that point to establish whether the allegations made in the e-mails were true or not and such determination was possible only after trial. But, still the Trial Court gave an order of injunction restraining the appellants from making “illegal allegations.” The High Court found that this was contrary to the facts since it was not possible for the court to say that it was not possible to establish whether the allegations made by the appellants were true or not and at the same time make an order to restrain them on the ground that such allegations were illegal. The e-mails were also found to have a close connection with legal notices and allegations of law violations. The Court thus held that the prospect of a justification/truth defence could not simply be waived off. Significantly, the Court held that when applying for an injunction in a defamation case, there is a reversal of burden of proof: The plaintiff must convince the Court that the justification defense of the defendant will certainly fail in the trial.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the injunction in question was vague since phrases like “third parties” and people who are “not directly involved” were not clearly defined. The plaintiff did not identify which recipients were allegedly not connected with the business.
JUDGMENT
The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeal and quashed the injunction order made by the Trial Court. The Court ruled that the Trial Judge had committed a legal error in that he had failed to consider the Bonnard Principle prior to issuing an interim injunction in the defamation case. As the Trial Court itself did not come to any definite conclusion about the falsity of the allegations or about the certainty of the failure of the defence of justification, the injunction could not be justified. The Court ruled the injunction vague due to the use of such expressions as “third parties” and “illegal allegations”. Thus, FMAT 220 of 2026 was allowed, the impugned Order No. 5 was quashed, and CAN 2 of 2026 was disposed of. The Court indicated that its observations were mere tentative ones and could have no bearing on the Trial Court while considering the defamation suit. There was no order as to costs.
CONCLUSION
From the decision in Anil Kaushik & Anr. v. Sourabh Khemani, one learns that the grant of interim injunctions in defamation cases should be approached with great caution by the court. Apart from considering the usual criteria for grant of interim injunction, viz., the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm, the Bonnard principle should also be taken into account. In the absence of an affirmative satisfaction by the court regarding the failure of the accused to establish his defence of justification through truth, it may not be appropriate to grant an injunction restraining the allegedly defamatory act of the accused. In this case, since the Trial Court itself was unable to decide on the authenticity of the allegations, it could not reasonably restrain the appellants based on the fact that they were “illegal.” It follows from the above that the High Court preserved the appellants’ right to raise their allegations during the trial process while ensuring that the veracity of those allegations would be determined by the proper court in the main proceedings.
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WRITTEN BY: KHWAISH SACHDEVA
