JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN PUBLIC SERVANT PROSECUTION: NAVIGATING THE INTERSECTION OF OFFICIAL DUTY, REQUIREMENTS, AND ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT

Case Name: Suneeti Toteja vs State of U.P. & Another

Case No.: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6898 of 2023

Date: February 25, 2025

Quorum: Justice Nagarathna. 

FACTS OF THE CASE 

The appellant is a regular government employee in the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) and was transfer to the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI). The case is filed on the complaint of an Associate Director in FSSAI, who said that she was sexually harassed repeatedly by the Enforcement Director in FSSAI during service. Following the complaint, an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) was constituted, to investigate into the case, and the final report of inquiry was submitted which implicated him in sex harassment and recommended registration of FIR against him and disciplinary action against the other officer concerned. There was no follow-up by FSSAI and the complainant was compelled to go to Aliganj Police Station, Lucknow and deposit FIR No. The appellant was never included in the initial ICC inquiry, nor was her name mentioned in the FIR. She first came on record in the statement recorded of the complainant. In this period, Dr. Ghonkrorkta approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) challenging the report of the ICC and the Tribunal had directed that the FSSAI not act upon the report of the ICC. The appellant, who was appointed as the Presiding Officer (PO) of the ICC, upon the completion of the term of the previous PO, had filed a counter affidavit in CAT proceedings on behalf of FSSAI officials to defend the report of the ICC. The complainant then complained that the appellant had filed this affidavit without her consent. Additionally, the complainant also accused the appellant of attempting to intimidate and coerce her into a settlement of the case and intimidating her in relation to her transfer from Delhi to Chennai. Based on such accusations, the appellant was arrayed in Chargesheet. The Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow, took cognizance of the charges and issued summons against the accused persons. 

ISSUES OF THE CASE 

1.  Whether the appellant’s actions, including filing a counter affidavit and subsequently amending it, indicate criminal intent or were part of her official duty. 
2. Whether the appellant, being a public official, required previous sanction for prosecution, and whether the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance without such sanction. 
3.  Whether refusal of sanction for prosecution by BIS (parent organization of the appellant) on 14.11.2022 was warranted in law. 
4. Whether prosecution was done legally despite the delay in getting sanction and its rejection.
5. Whether the order of the High Court denying quashing but allowing the appellant to go to the Magistrate and releasing on bail was legally proper. 

LEGAL PROVISIONS

1. Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty. 
2. Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: word, gesture, or act intended to insult modesty of a woman. 
3. Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Punishment for criminal conspiracy
4. Section 192 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Fabricating false evidence
5. Section 197 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Issuing or signing false certificate
6. Section 204 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Destruction of document or electronic record to prevent its production as evidence
7. Section 218 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or property from forfeiture
8. Section 202 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform
9. Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Forgery for purpose of cheating
10. Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record
11. Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860: Punishment for criminal intimidation. 
12. Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code: Examination of witnesses by police.
13. Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code: Recording of confessions and statements.

ARGUMENTS

Argument from the Appellant

The appellant stated that the High Court erred in denying quashing the chargesheet and summoning order where there was no sanction for prosecution. They mentioned that the she was acting in her official capacity, and the act of the investigating officer in not sending the request for sanction directly to BIS resulted in unwarranted delays.

Arguments raised by the Respondent 

The respondent took the defence of the cognizance on the basis that since no sanction for prosecution had been issued within the stipulated time, they proceeded on a deemed sanction, relying on Vineet Narain v. Union of India. The complainant’s counsel’s argument was supported by citation to Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, contending that where the sanctioning authority fails to make a decision within the prescribed time frame, sanction is deemed granted. It was also complained that the appellant had suppressed relevant facts and provided false evidence. But the Court rejected the argument of deemed sanction, stating that Section 197 CrPC does not envision such a concept and that the cited cases do not support this view. The Court observed that deemed sanction has not been incorporated in the statute, and therefore, prosecution of the appellant without valid sanction was unjustified. 

ANALYSIS 

The appeal revolves around the appellant, challenging the criminal proceedings launched against her, primarily on grounds of absence of sanction under Section 197 CrPC and absence of criminal intent. The appellant was not initially named in the FIR, and she became involved only in the statement under Section 164 CrPC of the complainant, and this questioned procedural fairness. Chargesheet and order of summons were served despite refusal of sanction for prosecution by BIS, her parent organization. The principal question of law is whether what she did—filing counter affidavit and alleged intimidation—constituted an offense or was within the cover of official duty. The High Court’s refusal to quash, coupled with directions to the appellant to approach the remedy before the Magistrate, brings into question the scope of judicial intervention under Section 482 CrPC. The prosecution’s application of presumed sanction was nullified as there is no provision in the CrPC for the same. The case raises the important trade-off between holding perpetrators of sexual harassment accountable and protecting public officials against harassment through trivial or procedurally flawed prosecutions.

JUDGEMENT

The Court was of the view that the prosecution of the appellant stood on shaky ground on the strength of failure to invoke compulsory sanction under Section 197 CrPC. The appellant, being the Presiding Officer of the ICC in her official capacity, required sanction before prosecution, which was not granted by the Magistrate. Her parent body, BIS, denied sanction, making the proceeding invalid. No evidence was discovered that the appellant had gone beyond official duties and it was held by the Court that the High Court erred in not quashing the chargesheet. Consequently, the Court reserved the chargesheet and summoning order, stressing the significance of compliance with procedures in prosecuting public officials. 

CONCLUSION 

The case is the important linkage between procedural justice and accountability in prosecuting public officials. The Court emphasized the need for pre-sanction under Section 197 CrPC before prosecuting a public servant for actions in discharge of official duties. BIS declined sanction, rendering prosecution impossible. The High Court’s refusal of quashing of the chargesheet was overruled, reaffirming protection of procedure. The judgment emphasizes the fine line between protecting officials from unwarranted prosecution and dispensing justice in sensitive cases like sexual harassment.

 

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WRITTEN BY SHIVRANJNI