CASE NAME: Balmukund Singh Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr.
CASE NUMBER: Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Criminal) No. 15349 of 2024
COURT: Supreme Court of India
DATE: 13 February 2026
QUORUM: Justice Vijay Bishnoi, Justice J.B. Pardiwala
FACTS
The present appeal was preferred by the Appellant for challenging the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 19 January 2024, wherein the High Court disposed of the third anticipatory bail application filed by the accused while directing the accused to surrender before the trial Court and move an application for regular bail. The factual matrix of the case revolves around an incident that occurred due to political rivalry between two groups and resulted in lodging of three FIRs on 02 June 2017. The subject FIR, i.e., the second FIR, wherein the impugned order of anticipatory bail was granted, was lodged by the original complainant, on 03 June 2017, under the IPC and the Arms Act of 1959 against 14 accused persons, including the accused and his father, Chandan Singh. It was alleged that when the complainant and his companions were returning after attending a function, the accused had wrongfully restrained them by stopping their car, attacked them, damaged the car and fired a gun with the intention of killing them. Further, it was alleged that when the complainant proceeded to report the matter, the accused again blocked the way and attempted to kill by firing guns. Around 100-150 people, with a common intention, had allegedly pelted stones, attacked with sticks and fired bullets. Bablu Chaudhary sustained bullet injuries and later succumbed to them.
The accused had been absconding since the date of the incident, in relation to which legal proceedings were initiated. On 10 May 2019, Shailendra alias Pintu, one of the victims, lodged an FIR against the accused, alleging that he had threatened to kill him if he pursued objections to the accused’s bail application. In apprehension of his arrest, the accused, on 28 November 2019, moved an application for anticipatory bail before the Trial court, which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the accused moved his application before the High Court, which was dismissed by order dated 11 February 2020. Aggrieved thereby, the accused filed a second anticipatory bail application before the High Court, which was also dismissed vide order dated 19 January 2021. The 22nd Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, on 24 June 2023, acquitted all the named accused in the Subject FIR, other than the absconding accused, of all the charges, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove that the victims were actually hit by the bullets of the named accused in the FIR. The accused then preferred his third anticipatory bail application, which was disposed of by way of the impugned order.
ISSUES
- Whether the High Court, by the Impugned Order, was justified in granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC to the Accused?
LEGAL PROVISIONS
- Sections 427, 294, 323, 341, 307, 302, 147, 148, 149 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).
- Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959.
- Sections 82, 83, 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).
ARGUMENTS
APPELLANT:
The counsel on behalf of the Appellant (complainant) contended that the Accused had been long absconding and not cooperating, exhibiting intent to evade the law. It was submitted that the accused was proceeded against under Section 82 of the CrPC and was declared a proclaimed offender, which was acknowledged by the High Court. The counsel relied on Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 8 SCC 730] to argue that an absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail. It was further submitted that the accused had a distinct role in the alleged offences, and the acquittal of the co-accused cannot be a consideration for extending the benefit of doubt to the accused and granting him anticipatory bail. They argued that the principle of parity was wrongly and blindly applied as the findings had no bearing to the accused. The counsel pointed to the risk to public safety and argued that the grant of anticipatory bail in such a perfunctory manner can have serious implications and amount to legal system manipulation. Relying on Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2020) 5 SCC 1], the counsel highlighted the considerations that ought to be weighed by the Court before the grant of anticipatory bail, and stated that none of those considerations was duly taken.
RESPONDENTS:
The counsel on behalf of the Respondent contended that the accused is not entitled to seek relief of anticipatory bail and has been absconding for almost six and a half years. It was submitted that the accused is a person who takes the law casually and that this is a case where one person has lost his life, and one sustained multiple injuries, wherein the witnesses and the injured had fully supported the case of the prosecution. The counsel stated that the Respondent State supports the appellant and prays that the order of the High Court be set aside.
ACCUSED:
The counsel on behalf of the Accused contended that the Accused was declared a proclaimed offender; however, no such proclamation was ever issued against him. It was submitted that the Trial Court’s judgment does not record that the proceedings under Section 82 of the CrPC were lawfully completed, nor did it declare the accused as a proclaimed offender. It was further argued that mere non-appearance cannot be equated with absconding in the eyes of the law. It was stated that the Trial Court recorded a clear finding that the prosecution failed to establish that the bullet fired by the Accused hit the injured person. It was submitted that the Appellant approached this Court with unclean hands and selectively disclosed material facts and that the resent appeal was driven by nothing but personal vendetta and deserved to be dismissed, being devoid of any merit.
ANALYSIS
The Hon’ble Court observed the definition of anticipatory bail and the requisite factors guiding the grant of anticipatory bail through judicial precedents. The court observed that it is not in dispute that the accused has been absconding from the date of the incident and has never cooperated with the investigation. It was noted that the lack of material on record to declare the accused as a proclaimed offender does not give the benefit to the accused of claiming anticipatory bail. It was observed that an absconder is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail as a general rule, except in certain exceptional cases. However, no such exceptional case was made out in favour of the Accused. The Hon’ble Court observed that the High Court in the impugned order had not rightly exercised the discretion to grant anticipatory bail. Furthermore, the ground raised by the Accused that other co-accused had been acquitted does not ipso facto entitle him to the relief of anticipatory bail on the ground of parity. Moreover, the accusations against the Accused have not been tried yet and are required to be independently examined. The court held that the High Court failed to consider that any finding recorded by the trial Court either against or in favour of the absconding Accused is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding the bail application.
JUDGMENT
The Hon’ble Court held that the Impugned order dated 19 January 2024 be set aside and directed the accused to surrender before the Court, within a period of four weeks. The court clarified that after the accused surrenders, he shall be free to seek a regular bail before the court concerned. The present appeal was therefore allowed.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the current case emphasises that an accused person who has consistently escaped the legal system cannot be granted anticipatory bail. The judgment thus reinforces accountability within the criminal process and sends a clear message that the rule of law cannot be undermined by strategic abscondence or procedural misuse.
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WRITTEN BY: STUTI ANVI
