CASE NAME: ABC vs XYZ (Names are not disclosed due to privacy reasons)
CASE NUMBER: MAT.APP.(F.C.) 111/2025
DATE: December 17, 2025
COURT: Delhi High Court
QUORUM: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani, Hon’ble Ms. Justice Renu Bhatnagar
FACTS
The present case arose from a difference in the division bench of the Delhi High Court. Specifically, the Court sought to determine whether a mandatory requirement of 1 year separation, followed by a 6-month cooling-off period required to file for divorce under Section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 (hereinafter referred as the Act), could be waived using the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. This allows for earlier filing in cases of “exceptional hardship” or “exceptional depravity,” as there were different views from various single-judge benches of the courts.
ISSUES
- Is there a mandatory requirement of a year of separation to file for divorce under Section 13B of the Act?
- Whether section 14(1) of the Act applies to a mutual divorce, which traditionally was used only for contesting a divorce?
LEGAL PROVISIONS
- Section 13B(1) of the Act
The section provides a requisite separation of at least one year between the couple to file for the first motion of divorce in the court, followed by a 6-month cooling period. - Section 14 of the Act
The statute quotes section 14 as: “No petition for divorce to be presented within one year of marriage.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for any court to entertain any petition for dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, 4[unless at the date of the presentation of the petition one one year has elapsed] since the date of the marriage: Provided that the court may, upon application made to it in accordance with such rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be presented [before one year has elapsed] since the date of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, but if it appears to the court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case, the court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not have effect until after the [expiry of one year] from the date of the marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to any petition which may be brought after [expiration of the said one year] upon the same or substantially the same facts as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed.
(2) In disposing of any application under this section for leave to present a petition for divorce before the [expiration of one year] from the date of the marriage, the court shall have regard to the interests of any children of the marriage and to the question whether there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the parties before the expiration of the [said one year].”
The section is usually applied to the fault theory of divorce. It bars divorce between couples who have not been married for even a year. However, the proviso under this section forgoes this rule if there is exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity among the couples.
ARGUMENTS
APPELANTS:
The appellants and the Amicus Curiae (friend of the court) advocated for a liberal and humanitarian interpretation of the sections under the Act. They noted the wording of sections 13 and 14 of the Act. Section 13, having explicitly mentioned “Subject to the provisions of this Act,” shall be subject to the other sections of the Act, including section 14. Additionally, Section 14 is a non obstante clause and shall have an overriding effect on different sections of the Act. Therefore, contested on the “complete code” theory (which suggested Section 13B is separate from Section 14). They also argued that the statutory waiting period was directory rather than mandatory. Thus, they prayed for the freedom of the spouses to move on with their lives, rather than forcing them to remain in a purposeless marriage.
RESPONDENTS:
The parties advocated the restrictive view (held by earlier Single Benches) that the one-year separation period is a matter of substantive law and not a mere procedural formality. From this perspective, it was argued that the period cannot be waived simply for the convenience of the parties involved in a suit that could defeat the purpose of the court, i.e., the preservation of marriage. They argued on the waiver of the provisions to be held solely by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution rather than the High Courts or the Family Courts.
ANALYSIS
The courts, after listening to both sides, noted the wording under sections 13 and 14. It relied on the reasoning of the appellants and sided with section 13B(1) not being a complete code, thus following under the exception of section 14 of the Act. The court also relied on Amardeep Singh vs. Harveen Kaur [(2017) 8 SCC 746], and relied on the objective of the cooling-off period, which is to prevent impulsive decisions rather than prolonging the agony of the parties.
JUDGEMENT
The court thus expressly overruled the decisions of Urvashi Sibal & Anr. vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2010 SCC OnLine Del 18), Mohin Saili vs. Nil (2010 SCC OnLine Del 4154), and Sunny vs. Sujata (2012 SCC OnLine Del 2439), which previously held that Section 13B was a “complete code” and its timelines were mandatory. The court thus stated that the one-year separation period followed by a 6-month cooling-off period prescribed under Section 13B(1) can be waived at the discretion of the Family Court or the High Court by invoking the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The Court held that it is not bound to ‘stall divorce by mutual consent’ or to precipitate unwilling persons into a ‘matrimonial abyss.’ In reducing the one-year separation requirement to a requirement capable of being waived in suitable cases, the Court sought to offer a way out to persons “trapped in manifestly unworkable matrimonial relationships.” Yet the Court added that the separation requirement is not to be readily dispensed, which could make the statutory requirements ‘frivolous and perfunctory’, but should be read with the provisos of section 14 of the Act to have a balance between the application of the statute and the provisions under it.
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WRITTEN BY: SHARANYA M
