Reevaluating Article 356 of the Indian Constitution: A Critical Perspective on Presidential Rule
ABSTRACT
Parliamentary approval is necessary for the imposition of the President’s Rule on any state. The proclamation of President’s Rule should be approved in both Houses of Parliament within two months of its issue. The approval is through a simple majority. The President’s Rule is initially for a period of six months. Later, it can be extended for a period of three years with parliamentary approval, every six months. The 44th Amendment to the Constitution (1978) brought in some constraints on the imposition of the President’s Rule beyond a period of one year. It says that President’s Rule cannot be extended beyond one year unless: There is a national emergency in India. the Election Commission of India certifies that it is necessary to continue the President’s Rule in the state because of difficulties in conducting assembly elections to the state. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, often referred to as the President’s Rule or State Emergency provision, grants the President of India the authority to impose federal rule over a state if the constitutional machinery of that state fails. This article has been a subject of intense debate and scrutiny due to its potential for misuse and the implications it holds for federalism in India. Originally designed to ensure stability and uphold constitutional governance, Article 356 has frequently been criticized for being a tool of political maneuvering. This critical perspective delves into the historical context, judicial interpretations, and political implications of invoking Article 356, arguing for a reevaluation to safeguard against its misuse while preserving its intended purpose. Historically, the provision was intended to address genuine breakdowns in state governance. However, the frequent imposition of President’s Rule, especially during the initial decades following India’s independence, revealed its susceptibility to political exploitation. Instances where central governments dismissed state governments led to accusations of undermining federalism and democratic principles. The Sarkaria Commission’s report and the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in the S.R. Bommai case (1994) sought to curb this misuse by emphasizing the necessity of objective criteria and judicial review. The Bommai verdict established that the President’s satisfaction under Article 356 is not absolute and is subject to judicial scrutiny, thus providing a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary use. Despite these safeguards, concerns remain. The invocation of Article 356 often reflects underlying political conflicts rather than genuine constitutional crises. The role of the Governor, often seen as an agent of the central government, further complicates the scenario, raising questions about impartiality and the true spirit of cooperative federalism. Critics argue that such interventions disrupt the democratic process and weaken state autonomy, contradicting the federal structure envisioned by the Constitution. A critical reevaluation of Article 356 necessitates strengthening the safeguards to prevent its misuse. Recommendations include clearer definitions of what constitutes a “breakdown of constitutional machinery, enhanced transparency in the decision-making process, and more stringent judicial oversight. Additionally, reforming the appointment and functioning of
Governors to ensure their impartiality and adherence to constitutional mandates is imperative. while Article 356 remains a necessary provision for addressing extraordinary situations, its application must be judicious, transparent, and in true spirit of federalism. Reevaluating this article through a critical lens is essential to balance the need for national integrity with the preservation of state autonomy, thereby reinforcing the democratic foundation of India.
Keywords: Article 356, President’s Rule, State Emergency, Constitutional machinery, Federalism, Political maneuvering, Misuse, Historical context, Judicial interpretation, S.R. Bommai case, Safeguards, Breakdown of constitutional machinery, Judicial review, Federal balance, Political implications, Kerala (1959), Punjab (1987), Bihar (2005), Revaluation, Reform, Role of the Governor, Constitutional Amendments, Political consensus, Democratic principles, Federal integrity,
Introduction
Article 356 of the Constitution of India is based on Section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935.According to Article 356, President’s Rule can be imposed on any state of India on the grounds of the failure of the constitutional machinery. This is of two types: If the President receives a report from the state’s Governor or otherwise is convinced or satisfied that the state’s situation is such that the state government cannot carry on the governance according to the provisions of the Constitution. Article 365: As per this Article, President’s Rule can be imposed if any state fails to comply with all directions given by the Union on matters it is empowered to. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution is one of the most contentious and debated provisions, often criticized for its potential misuse and significant implications on the federal structure of the country. Commonly referred to as the “President’s Rule,” this article allows the Central Government to dissolve a state government and assume direct control if the President, upon receiving a report from the Governor or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Since its inception, Article 356 has been a subject of intense scrutiny and debate, with numerous instances of its invocation leading to political controversy. This article critically evaluates the historical context, judicial interpretations, and political implications of Article 356, and argues for a nuanced revaluation of its necessity and implementation in contemporary India.
Historical Context and Constitutional Framework
Article 356 is rooted in the Government of India Act, 1935, which provided a framework for the British Crown to assume control over provincial governments under certain circumstances. The framers of the Indian Constitution included similar provisions to address scenarios where a state government fails to function according to constitutional norms. The Constituent Assembly Debates reflect a cautious approach towards this provision, with several members expressing concerns over potential misuse. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, a principal architect of the Constitution, assured that Article 356 would be used sparingly and only as a measure of last resort. Despite these assurances, the provision has been invoked over 120 times since the Constitution came into effect in 1950, often under circumstances that have raised questions about political motivations.
Judicial Interpretation and Safeguards
The judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting Article 356 and establishing safeguards against its misuse. The landmark case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) is a pivotal moment in this context. The Supreme Court laid down significant guidelines to restrict arbitrary imposition of President’s Rule. The judgment emphasized that the President’s satisfaction under Article 356 is not absolute and is subject to judicial review. It also established that the power under Article 356 should be used sparingly and only when there is a breakdown of constitutional machinery, not for political reasons.
The Bommai judgment articulated several principles to guide the imposition of President’s Rule:
Breakdown of Constitutional Machinery: There must be tangible evidence of a breakdown of constitutional governance in the state.
Scope of Judicial Review: Courts can review the material based on which President’s Rule is imposed to ensure it is not based on extraneous or irrelevant grounds.
Interim Measures: The court can grant interim relief to prevent the arbitrary dismissal of a state government.
Federal Balance: The judgment reinforced the importance of maintaining a balance between the Centre and the states, emphasizing the federal structure of the Constitution. Despite these safeguards, the misuse of Article 356 has not been entirely curtailed. Political parties continue to challenge its invocation, and courts frequently intervene to assess the validity of such proclamations.
Misuse of Article 356
Article 356 gave the Central government wide powers to stamp its authority on the state governments. Although it was meant only as a means to preserve the integrity and unity of the country, it had been used blatantly to oust state governments who were ruled by political opponents of the centre. It was used for the first time in 1951 in Punjab. Between 1966 and 1977, Indira Gandhi’s government used it about 39 times against various states. In the S.R. Bommai case (1994), the Supreme Court of India put forth strict guidelines for the imposition of Article 356. The proclamation (of President’s Rule) is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fide intention. The imposition of Article 356 should be justified by the centre. The court has the power to revive the suspended or dissolved state government if the grounds for the imposition is found to be invalid and unconstitutional. The state assembly cannot be dissolved before parliamentary approval for the imposition of Article 356 and the President can only suspend the assembly. Serious allegations of corruption against the state ministry and financial instability are not grounds for the imposition of Article 356.Any action by the state government that leads to the security of secularism (which is a basic feature of the Constitution) cannot be grounds for the use of Article 356. Article 356 cannot be used to sort out any intraparty issues in the ruling party. If the Ministry of the state resigns or is dismissed or loses the majority, then the governor cannot advise the President to impose this article until enough steps are taken by the governor for the formation of an alternative government. The power under Article 356 is to be used only in case of exigencies. It is an exceptional power. There have also been subsequent judgements of the SC that have limited the room for the misuse of this Article.
The Sarkaria Commission Report (1983) recommended that Article 356 should be used “very sparingly” and only as a last resort. The President’s proclamation of President’s Rule should include reasons as to why he thinks the state cannot run normally. Whenever possible, the centre should give the state government a warning before imposing Article 356. The Article should not be used for settling political scores. The commission recommended the amendment of the article in order for the President to be authorised to dissolve the state legislature only after getting parliamentary approval. The Punchhi Commission recommended that the centre should try to bring only a specific troubled area under its jurisdiction and that too for a brief period, not more than three months. The commission recommended that suitable amendments should be made to incorporate the guidelines established by SC in the Bommai case. The commission recommended the provision of a ‘Localized Emergency’ which implies that the centre can tackle issues at town/district (local) level without dissolving the state legislative assembly while at the same time, performing the duty of the Union to protect States as per Article 355.
Political Implications and Misuse
Article 356 has often been used as a political tool by the ruling party at the Centre to destabilize or dismiss state governments led by opposition parties. This practice undermines the federal principles enshrined in the Constitution and disrupts the democratic process at the state level. The imposition of President’s Rule has led to significant political upheaval, including the dissolution of legislative assemblies and the dismissal of democratically elected governments.
Several notable instances of the misuse of Article 356 include: Kerala (1959): The first use of Article 356 to dismiss the communist government led by E.M.S. Namboodiri pad. This move was widely criticized as politically motivated.
Punjab (1987): President’s Rule was imposed amidst insurgency and political instability, raising questions about the timing and necessity of the intervention.
Bihar (2005): The dissolution of the assembly following a hung verdict, which the Supreme Court later declared unconstitutional. These cases highlight the contentious nature of Article 356 and its potential for abuse. The frequent invocation of this article has led to calls for its repeal or significant amendment to prevent arbitrary use.
Need for Revaluation and Reform
The frequent and often controversial use of Article 356 necessitates a critical revaluation of its place in the Indian constitutional framework. Several reforms have been proposed to address the misuse and ensure that the provision is used in the true spirit of the Constitution:
Amendment of Article 356: To include more specific and stringent criteria for its invocation, thereby reducing the scope for arbitrary use.
Role of the Governor: Redefining the role and appointment process of Governors to ensure impartiality and independence from the Central Government.
Strengthening Judicial Review: Providing for a more robust mechanism for judicial review to ensure that proclamations under Article 356 are subject to rigorous scrutiny.
Political Consensus: Encouraging political parties to adopt a consensus-based approach to the use of Article 356, respecting the federal structure and democratic principles.
Conclusion
Article 356 remains a double-edged sword in the Indian constitutional framework. While it provides a mechanism to address genuine breakdowns of constitutional machinery, its potential for misuse poses a significant threat to the federal structure and democratic ethos of the country. The judicial safeguards established in the Bommai case are crucial but not sufficient to prevent arbitrary use. A comprehensive revaluation and reform of Article 356 are imperative to align its application with the principles of federalism and democracy. By amending the provision, redefining the role of Governors, strengthening judicial review, and fostering political consensus, India can ensure that Article 356 serves its intended purpose without compromising the democratic process and federal integrity of the nation. The appropriate provision should be incorporated where by it provides that until both Houses of Parliament approve the proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356, the Legislative Assembly cannot be dissolved. If necessary,
it can be kept only under animated suspension. before issuing the proclamation under clause (1), the President/the Central Government should indicate to the State Government the matters wherein the State Government is not acting in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and give it a reasonable opportunity of redressing the situation, unless the situation is such that following the above course would not be in the interest of security of State or defence and integrity of the country as a whole. In the light of the entire preceding discussion, the question arises whether Article 356 needs to be amended. In fact, there has been a strident demand for deletion of Article 356 but if Article 356 is removed while retaining Articles 355 and 365, the situation may be worse from the point of view of the States. In other words, the checks which are created by Article 356 and in particular by clause (3) thereof, would not be there and the Central Government would be free to act in the name of redressing a situation where the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is therefore not favourable to incline towards the deletion of Article 356 in its entirety. To protect the federal structure of India, it is compulsory to amend Article 356 in line with recommendations put forward by the court in Bommai’s case as well as by the Sarkaria Commission. President rule should always be the last resort and all the steps such as warning the state government that it is not working in accordance with Constitutional provisions, floor test to prove majority, etc. should be followed by the governor. Therefore, it can be only expected through a strict interpretation of Article 356 that the spirit of ‘co-federation should be maintained while opting for President rule and union government shouldn’t use this power to seek their own political interests.
written by Hari Raghava JP
