Case Name: State of H.P. & anr v. M/s Jagson International Ltd.
Case No.: OMP(M) No. 89 of 2024
Dated: April 30, 2024
Quorum: Justice Satyen Vaidya
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The instant application for a pardon of delay was filed with the allegations that no decision could be made regarding a challenge to the contested award until after general elections were conducted by the Election Commission on November 11, 2022, and the majority of senior officers were on election duty until December 8, 2022.
Furthermore, it has been claimed that even after 8.12.2023, the government took a long time to form. Again, for this reason, it was not possible to decide whether to dispute the award, and as a result, the petition’s filing was delayed by 30 days.
The respondent has objected to the prayer for a pardon of the delay. It has been argued that 120 days is the maximum amount of time that an application under Section 34 of the Act may be filed, according to the Act. Based on calculations made by the respondent, the petitioners’ Section 34 Act application was deemed unmaintainable since it was filed 122 days after it was submitted.
It has also been claimed that even after 8.12.2023, the government took a long time to form, and once more, as a result, no decision could be made to contest the award. As a result, the filing of the petition was delayed by thirty days throughout this process.
LEGAL PROVISIONS:
- Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. If a request was made under section 33, the request may be set aside only after three months have passed from the date the party making the request received the arbitral award or the date the arbitral tribunal decided to proceed with the request. The applicant may file an extension of thirty days for the Court to consider the application, but only if the Court determines that the applicant was prevented from filing within the allotted three months due to substantial reason.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:
According to the petitioners, the decision to file the application could not be made since there would be elections until December 8, 2022, and then there would be a delay in the formation of the government. From my perspective, the petitioners’ given cause is extremely ambiguous.
The petitioners contended that because the majority of senior officers were assigned to election duty until December 8, 2022, and because general elections were scheduled by the Election Commission on November 11, 2022, no decision could be made regarding a challenge to the contested award until after that date. This was the basis for their instant application for a pardon of delay.
It has also been claimed that even after 8.12.2023, the government took a long time to form, and once more, as a result, no decision could be made to contest the award. As a result, the filing of the petition was delayed by 30 days throughout this process.
The petitioners argued that In response to the explanation provided by the petitioners for the delay in filing the application, it has been stated that the decision to file the application could not be made because of elections through December 8, 2022, and the subsequent delay in the formation of the Government.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
The learned counsel representing the respondents argued that the respondent has objected to the prayer for a pardon of the delay. It has been argued that 120 days is the maximum amount of time that an application under Section 34 of the Act may be filed, according to the Act. The petitioners’ application under Section 34 of the Act was deemed preferable by the respondent after 122 days, indicating that the application was not maintainable.
It has also been claimed that the Act’s Section 34(3) allows for a maximum extension of 30 days during the period beyond three months, provided the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented from filing the application within the three months allotted by justifiable cause.
The respondent claims that the petitioners seeking an extension of time past three months have not established any cause at all, let alone adequate cause. At the application hearing, the respondent also presented the argument that the statute of limitations of 30 days beyond a period of three months had run out on November 3, 2023—a public holiday known as Second Saturday. The public holiday continued into the following day, 12.3.2023.
The repondents argued that the petitioners had given notice under Section 34(5) of the Act on 7.2.2023 indicating their intention to file the application under Section 34 of the Act, according to the respondent’s specific submission. The application, which can be found on page 206 of the paper book, has a copy of the notice that the petitioners sent to the respondent in accordance with Section 34(5) of the Act attached as Annexure P-5.
COURT’S ANALYSIS AND JUDGMENT:
The respondent’s argument that the petitioners filed the application 122 days later seems to be based on an incorrect computation. Instead of using the three months that are specified in sub-Section (3) of Section 34 of the Act, the respondent has computed a period of 90 days, which is not an accurate calculating method. Since three months would equate to the conclusion of three calendar months, the three months in this instance had ended on 11.2.2023.
The petitioners have therefore requested a 30-day period of condonation. Under this interpretation, there is no reason not to evaluate the merits of an immediate application for a pardon of tardiness.
The petitioners were expected to disclose their bona fides together with a reasonable explanation for their failure to file the application within the allotted time, as required by the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, as the court observed. The petitioners have utterly failed to provide any justification at all, much less a compelling one.
Even the nebulous claims regarding the obstruction of decision-making caused by the elections and the subsequent formation of the government are refuted by the fact that on 7.2.2023, the petitioners themselves issued a notice under Section 34(5) of the Act, indicating that a decision had already been made by 7.2.2023 to file the application under Section 34 of the Act. However, the application was not filed until 13.3.2023 and there is no explanation provided as to why it was not filed immediately after 7.2.2023.
Based on the presented facts and legal explanation, the court determined that the petitioners have not demonstrated a valid reason, much less a sufficient one, for their failure to file their Section 34 Act application within the allotted three months. Consequently, the application is rejected as it is deemed unsuccessful.
“PRIME LEGAL is a full-service law firm that has won a National Award and has more than 20 years of experience in an array of sectors and practice areas. Prime legal fall into a category of best law firm, best lawyer, best family lawyer, best divorce lawyer, best divorce law firm, best criminal lawyer, best criminal law firm, best consumer lawyer, best civil lawyer.”
Judgment reviewed by Riddhi S Bhora.
