

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA**Cr. MP (M) No. 2763 of 2025****Reserved on: 16.12.2025****Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.**

Abhishek**...Petitioner****Versus****State of Himachal Pradesh****...Respondent**

Coram***Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.******Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.*****For the Petitioner : Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri,
Advocate.****For the Respondent/State : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy
Advocate General.**

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 71 of 2025, dated 28.5.2025, registered in Police Station, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 152 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

2. It has been asserted that the police party was on patrolling duty on 28.5.2025 when they received secret

¹ Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

information that Abhishek Singh Bhardwaj, the present petitioner, had uploaded his photo and video on Facebook with prohibited/illegal weapons, and he was following anti-national persons. The police associated Mohinder Singh and reached the petitioner's house, where his parents were present. The petitioner came out after some time. The police asked the petitioner to open his Facebook ID, photographs and video. The flag of Pakistan and arms were found uploaded. The police searched the house, but no prohibited arms were recovered. The police seized the mobile phone. The petitioner had shared the information about Operation Sindoor with some Pakistani persons, wherein he declared that Operation Sindoor was wrong and he supported Khalistan. These allegations are false. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, the petition.

3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were on patrolling duty on 28.5.2025. They received secret information at Dehra Chowk that the petitioner had uploaded photos and videos with prohibited

weapons. He had written his name with those weapons. The police informed SDPO about the information, joined Jagdish Ram and Mohinder Singh as independent witnesses and went to the petitioner's house. The petitioner's parents were found in the house. The petitioner also came out after some time. His Facebook ID was checked, and the photographs of prohibited weapons, videos, flag of Pakistan were found to be uploaded. The police searched the house, but no illegal substance was found. The police seized the mobile phone. The petitioner had chatted with Niaz Khan, in which he had stated that Operation Sindoor was wrong; and he had supported Khalistan. The mobile phone was sent to the FSL, and the result has been obtained. The police investigated the matter and filed the charge sheet. The matter is listed for recording the statements of the prosecution's witnesses on 14.1.2026.

4. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

5. Mr Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the allegations made in the FIR do not

satisfy the requirement of Section 152 of the BNS. The police have filed the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

6. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was involved in anti-national activities. He was in touch with Pakistani Nationals. The offence is grave. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Pinki v. State of U.P.*, (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail

56. In *Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P.*, (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be consid-

ered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7–9)

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

8. *Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]*

9. *Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)*

57. In *Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284–85, para 8)

“8. *The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which con-*

viction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce *prima facie* evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)

58. This Court in *Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh*, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)

59. In *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan*, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

60. In *Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee*, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

“9. ... It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are:

- (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence;*
- (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;*
- (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;*
- (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;*
- (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;*
- (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;*
- (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and*

(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is *Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar*, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (*Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar*, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and *Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar*, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (*Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar*, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170], SCC p. 511, para 35)

“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a *prima facie* conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a *prima facie* conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied)

9. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

10. The offence punishable under Section 152 of BNS corresponds to Section 124A of IPC. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Vinod Dua v. Union of India*, (2023) 14 SCC 286: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 414 that Section 124A applies to such activities which are intended or tend to create disorder or disturbance of the public peace. It was observed at page 339:

45. These passages elucidate what was accepted by this Court in preference to the decisions of the Privy Council in *Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress*, 1897 SCC OnLine PC 23: (1897-98) 25 IA 1] and in *King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao*, 1947 SCC OnLine PC 9: (1946-47) 74 IA 89]. The statements of law deducible from the decision in *Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar*, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955 are as follows:

45.1. "The expression 'the Government established by law' has to be distinguished from the persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration. "Government established by law" is the visible symbol of the State. The very existence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted. (*Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar*, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC OnLine SC para 24)

45.2. "Any acts within the meaning of Section 124-A which have the effect of subverting the Government by bringing that Government into contempt or hatred, or creating disaffection against it, would be within the penal statute because the feeling of disloyalty to the Government established by law or enmity to it imports the idea of tendency to public disorder by the use of actual violence or incitement to violence." (*Kedar Nath Singh*

v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC OnLine SC para 24)

45.3. “Comments, however strongly worded, expressing disapprobation of actions of the Government, without exciting those feelings which generate the inclination to cause public disorder by acts of violence, would not be penal.” (*Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955, SCC OnLine SC para 24)*)

45.4. “A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder.” (*Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955, SCC OnLine SC para 25)*)

45.5. “The provisions of the sections [The reference was to Sections 124-A and 505 IPC.] read as a whole, along with the Explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.” (*Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955], SCC OnLine SC para 26)*)

45.6. “It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc., which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order, that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order.” (*Kedar Nath*

Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955, SCC OnLine SC para 26)

45.7. (g) “We propose to limit its operation only to such activities as come within the ambit of the observations of the Federal Court, that is to say, activities involving incitement to violence or intention or tendency to create public disorder or cause disturbance of public peace.” (*Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 6: 1962 Supp (2) SCR 769: AIR 1962 SC 955*], SCC OnLine SC para 27)

As the statement of law at para 45.5 above indicates, it applies to cases under Sections 124-A and 505IPC. According to this Court, only such activities which would be intended or have a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence are rendered penal.

11. A similar view was taken in *Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1*, wherein it was observed: –

16. Section 153-A IPC, as extracted hereinabove, covers a case where a person by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities or acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity. The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC, and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has

to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge, nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.

17. In *Ramesh v. Union of India* [(1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266: AIR 1988 SC 775], this Court held that TV serial *Tamas* did not depict communal tension and violence and the provisions of Section 153-A IPC would not apply to it. It was also not prejudicial to national integration, falling under Section 153-B IPC. Approving the observations of Vivian Bose, J., in *Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt.* [AIR 1947 Nag 1] The Court observed that

“the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. ... It is the standard of an ordinary, reasonable man, or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’.” (*Ramesh case* [(1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266: AIR 1988 SC 775], SCC p. 676, para 13)

18. Again, in *Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.* [(1997) 7 SCC 431: 1997 SCC (Cri) 1094], it is held that the common feature in both the sections, viz. Sections 153-A and 505(2), being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will “between different” religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Further, it was observed that merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections.

12. This position was reiterated in *Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra*, (2024) 4 SCC 156: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 383: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 249 (supra), wherein it was observed at page 161: –

8. This Court in *Manzar Sayeed Khan [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417]* referred to the view taken by Vivian Bose, J., as a Judge of the erstwhile Nagpur High Court in *Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt.*, 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5: AIR 1947 Nag 1 A Division Bench of the High Court dealt with the offence of sedition under Section 124-AIPC and Section 4(1) of the Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. The issue was whether a particular article in the press tends, directly or indirectly, to bring hatred or contempt to the Government established in law. This Court has approved this view in its decision in *Ramesh v. Union of India*, (1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266]. In the said case, this Court dealt with the issue of the applicability of Section 153-AIPC. In para 13, it was held thus : (*Ramesh v. Union of India*, (1988) 1 SCC 668: 1988 SCC (Cri) 266], SCC p. 676)

“13. ... the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. ... It is the standard of an ordinary, reasonable man or as they say in English law, ‘the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus’. (*Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Govt.*, 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5: AIR 1947 Nag 1], SCC OnLine MP para 67)” (emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the yardstick laid down by Vivian Bose, J., will have to be applied while judging the effect of the words, spoken or written, in the context of Section 153-AIPC.

9. We may also make a useful reference to a decision of this Court in *Patricia Mukhim v. State of Meghalaya*, (2021) 15 SCC 35. Paras 8 to 10 of the said decision read thus : (SCC pp. 41-43)

“8. ‘It is of utmost importance to keep all speech free in order for the truth to emerge and have a civil society.’— Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a very valuable fundamental right. However, the right is not absolute. Reasonable restrictions can be placed on the right of free speech and expression in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion of enmity between different groups on the grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with a fine or with both under Section 153-A. As we are called upon to decide whether a prima facie case is made out against the appellant for committing offences under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to reproduce the provisions, which are as follows:

9. Only where the written or spoken words have the tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affecting public tranquillity, the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. *The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-AIPC, and the*

prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. [Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214: 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]

10. The gist of the offence under Section 153-AIPC is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the piece of writing and the circumstances in which it was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge, nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 415].”

(emphasis in original and supplied)

13. There is no averment in the FIR that any hatred or discontent was directed towards the Government established by law in India. The Pen Drive containing the images and the video was also perused by me. *Prima facie*, they show that the petitioner chatted with someone, and both of them criticised the hostilities between India and Pakistan. They advocated that all people, irrespective of their religion, should stay together, and that the war serves no fruitful purpose. It is difficult to see how a desire to end the hostilities and a return to peace can amount to sedition.

14. It is undisputed that no prohibited weapon was recovered from the petitioner. Thus, merely posting the prohibited arms forming the name of a person does not amount to sedition.

15. It was submitted that the petitioner had raised the slogan of Khalistan Zindabad. This Court was unable to locate any such slogan in the data extracted from the mobile phone, but assuming that it is correct, it was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in *Balwant Singh v. State of H.P. (1995) 3 SCC 124* that raising the slogan of Khalistan Zindabad does not amount to any offence. It was observed:-

9. Insofar as the offence under Section 153-A IPC is concerned, it provides for punishment for promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever or brings about disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups or castes or communities. In our opinion, only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affect public tranquillity, that the law need to step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and circumstances of this case unmistakably show that there was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law and order, or public order or peace and tranquillity in the area from where the appellants were apprehended while raising slogans on account of the activities of the

appellants. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC, and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their casually raising the three slogans a couple of times. The offence under Section 153-A IPC is, therefore, not made out.

16. In the present case, the slogans were posted, as per the prosecution, on Facebook. There is no evidence, whatsoever, at this stage to show that any person was excited towards disaffection by posting these slogans. Thus, the mere posting of the slogans will not *prima facie* amount to any offence.

17. The police have filed the charge sheet before the learned Trial Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The provisions of bail cannot be used to punish a person before the proof of his guilt. Hence, the petitioner deserves to be released on bail.

18. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: -

- (i) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever;
- (ii) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;
- (iii) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court;
- (iv) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and
- (v) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

19. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail.

20. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, Lala Lajpat Rai District and Air Correctional Home, Dharamshala, HP and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

21. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits.

22. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may be ascertained from the official website of this Court.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge

1st January, 2026
(Chander)